Chapter V attempts to provide the elements of a solution to the problem of how terms in theoretical sciences acquire their reference. Its proposal is that a theory of reference-acquisition for theoretical terms should acknowledge the fact that what fixes the reference of a theoretical term is typically the embedding theory as a whole, not an austere causal description like 'the item causally responsible for event E.' It is argued that there are epistemic reasons for the existence of this phenomenon, (...) and an attempt is made to show how, by appealing to these reasons, it is nonetheless possible to understand the reference-determining role of theories in such a way that occurrences of a term embedded in incompatible theoretical frameworks can often be interpreted as co-referential. ;Chapter IV is an interlude. It argues for the relevance of the theory of reference to the topic of intertheoretic reduction. It does this by attempting to demonstrate that intertheoretic reduction in the natural sciences requires intertheoretic identities involving theoretical terms, and that making sense of such identities demands a theory of reference-acquisition for theoretical terms. The chapter also argues that the problem of how mathematical terms secure their reference precludes an obvious extension of this model to examples of reduction in mathematics. It further criticizes attempts to make sense of mathematical reductions in terms of concepts of ontological reduction, and it suggests that much recent work on ontological reduction, especially the attempt to exclude all-out 'Pythagorean' reductions, is flawed through its failure to take referential semantics seriously. ;Chapter II contains exposition and criticism of both the descriptivist account of reference and Kripke's version of the 'causal' account of reference. The latter account is represented as a recursive account, with a base clause specifying how terms initially acquire their reference and a recursion clause specifying how the ability to use a term with a certain reference is transmitted to other users . It is argued that the Kripkean formulation of referential intentions at the reference-transmission stage is flawed, in part because the formulation makes his account unable to capture the dynamics of the way in which a person's use of a term may undergo reference-shifts without these shifts in reference being intended. ;The third chapter suggests an alternative account. It motivates and sketches a mixed causal-descriptivist theory speaker's reference, formulated in terms of first-order referential intentions, and then uses this theory to sketch aspects of a mixed causal-descriptivist account of term reference, formulated in terms of second-order intentions to intend the 'right' object . It is argued that such an account provides a plausible solution to a number of problems confronting Kripke's account, including that of unintended reference-shifts. ;This dissertation consists of five chapters whose unifying theme is the theory of term-reference. The first chapter offers an overview and critical comparison of two opposing approaches to the topic of reference: the semantic holism of Quine-Davidson, and the semantic atomism of those who treat reference as a relation that grounds the assignment of truth-conditions to sentences. The chapter argues that the apparent theoretical importance of referential intentions, emphasised in Saul Kripke's work on reference and argued for in detail in chapter III of the dissertation, provides strong support for semantic atomism, since such intentions are used to explain reference-assignments and, indirectly, truth-conditions. (shrink)